


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*No Foreign Dissem*



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## STAFF NOTES:

**Middle East  
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South Asia**

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No. 0666/75  
May 7, 1975

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## MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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
Tunisia

*Bourguiba Changes Signals on Succession*

President Bourguiba may be reviving a plan to designate his son, Habib Bourguiba, Jr., as his heir apparent. [REDACTED] the President has decided to appoint his son prime minister within the next year. Under the constitution the prime minister succeeds the president if he leaves office or becomes disabled.

25X1C

The younger Bourguiba recently has been silent concerning his own intentions. In the past, President Bourguiba has urged his son to become his successor, but the son reportedly refused, objecting that this could create a "Haitian model" hereditary presidency in Tunisia. Publicly, the President refers to the present prime minister, Hedi Nour, as his "caliph" or successor. Nour has been a party ideologist and trusted aide to Bourguiba ever since the struggle for independence from France during the 1940s and 1950s. In Tunisian political circles Nour's succession has been viewed as all but a foregone conclusion.



Sayah, himself a protege of Bourguiba, has his own eye on the presidency. He has placed trusted friends

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in key positions where they could cause problems for a successor president. Recently he has sought to improve his strained relations with the younger Bourguiba in an effort to improve his image and political fortunes as the day approaches when President Bourguiba passes from the scene.

Political maneuvering by party officials, cabinet members and advisors will probably continue to surface as the Bourguiba era slowly winds down. Bourguiba, however, can be expected to react vigorously to any suggestions that he relinquish power before he is ready to step aside. (SECRET NFD/CD/NDA)

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
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Uganda

*Anti-Amin Plotters Claim  
Important Tribal Support*

Exiled politicians are again discussing plans for an attempt to overthrow President Amin. The plotters claim to have the support of leading members of several tribes that are significantly represented in the armed forces. Prospects for a successful coup may have been somewhat improved by disaffection reported among military men in recent months. Nonetheless, the plotters face formidable obstacles in mounting a successful operation.

25X1C



The plotters are from several northeastern Ugandan tribes that have traditionally predominated in the army. The plotters are reported to have achieved a degree of agreement but still appear distrustful of each other.

There have been a number of unsuccessful moves against Amin since he took power in January 1971. An invasion of Uganda in 1972 by exiles operating from Tanzania was defeated by the Ugandan army. Numerous efforts by exiles to send assassination teams into Uganda have proven woefully inept.

Amin's repressive policies have decimated Uganda's civilian leadership and left its remnants demoralized. The armed forces appear to be the only possible source

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
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of a threat to Amin's rule, apart from an individual violent act. The plotters' ability to persuade their fellow tribesmen in the army to move against Amin is probably limited.

Under Amin, military personnel, most of whom are poor, uneducated peasants, have become the most favored element of the population. Amin also has brought into the army several thousand tribesmen from Sudan with whom he has tribal ties, and these Sudanese probably tend to side with him.

On the other hand, high military spending and the expulsion of Uganda's productive Asian minority have brought the economy to stagnation, and even the army is now experiencing hardship as a result of shortages of foodstuffs and other necessities. The government has at times fallen several months in arrears in paying the armed forces. Moreover, numerous tribal purges within military ranks since Amin took power have left some military personnel with a strong desire for revenge against him. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

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India-Canada

*Nuclear Talks*

India and Canada made limited progress, in technical-level talks last week, toward removing obstacles to a resumption of Canadian nuclear assistance. No agreements were reached, but both sides decided to ask their respective cabinets to determine if higher-level negotiations should be scheduled. Ottawa halted its nuclear assistance to India a year ago following India's nuclear explosion.

As a price for resuming its aid, Ottawa wants to extend in time and coverage the safeguards on the Canadian-built atomic power project in the Indian state of Rajasthan. These safeguards are now scheduled to expire in 1976. The Canadians also wish to bring the International Atomic Energy Agency into the agreement as a third party. The Canadians reportedly are optimistic about securing Indian compromises on these matters, and would consider an agreement a first step toward their further requirement that India promise not to export its nuclear explosives technology.

At the talks the Canadians made clear that a second Indian nuclear test at this time would probably kill chances for further negotiations. The Indians have publicly maintained for months that they are contemplating additional tests. The need for Canadian assistance in the nuclear field, however, should deter New Delhi at least until the issue of a resumption of aid is resolved. (CONFIDENTIAL)



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